Intellectual Property Brief
Volume 1
Issue 1 Spring 2010

Article 6

1-1-2010

Settling for Less? An Analysis of the Possibility of
Positive Legal Precedent on the Internet if the
Google Book Search Litigation Had Not Reached a
Settlement
Brooke Ericson

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/ipbrief
Part of the Intellectual Property Commons
Recommended Citation
Ericson, Brooke. “Settling for Less? An Analysis of the Possibility of Positive Legal Precedent on the Internet if the Google Book
Search Litigation Had Not Reached a Settlement.” American University Intellectual Property Brief, Spring 2010, 33-43.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Intellectual Property Brief by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

Settling for Less? An Analysis of the Possibility of Positive Legal Precedent
on the Internet if the Google Book Search Litigation Had Not Reached a
Settlement
Keywords

Google, Google book search litigation, Internet, Google settlement, Copyright, Copyright fair use

This article is available in Intellectual Property Brief: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/ipbrief/vol1/iss1/6

Settling for Less? An Analysis of the Possibility of Positive Legal Precedent
on the Internet if the Google Book Search Litigation Had Not Reached a
Settlement
By Brooke Ericson1
I. Introduction1
A final hearing held in early February will lead to an
opinion by U.S. District Judge Denny Chin for the
Southern District of New York, determining whether the
Google Book Search Settlement is upheld or rejected.
Google’s competitors argue antitrust violations,2 the
National Writers Union
calls the settlement “grossly
unfair”3 and library
associations worry about the
lack of guarantees to current
and future access.4 This
article will focus on another
critique of the Google Book
Settlement: that by settling,
Google is avoiding the fight
for a positive legal precedent
for copyright fair use on
the Internet and is only
concerned with its own business interests.5 This logic
1. Brooke Ericson, 2011 J.D. Candidate at American University,
Washington College of Law , B.A. in Journalism in 2008 at University of North Carolina. Brooke was a 2009-2010 Articles Writer
for The Intellectual Property Brief and is the incoming 2010-2011
Copyright Section Editor. Brooke is also a junior staff member for
the Administrative Law Review and will serve as a 2010-2011 Note
& Comment Editor.
2. See Jacqui Cheng, Microsoft, Amazon Join Opposition to Google
Books Settlement, Ars Technica, Aug. 21, 2009, http://arstechnica.
com/tech-policy/news/2009/08/microsoft-amazon-join-oppositionto-google-books-settlement.ars.
3. See Ryan Singel, National Writers Union Opposes Google Book
Settlement, Wired.com, Aug. 13, 2009, http://www.wired.com/
epicenter/2009/08/national-writers-union-opposes-google-booksettlement/.
4. See John Timmer, Google Book Settlement Has Librarians Worried,
Ars Technica, May 5, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
news/2009/05/libraries-weigh-in-with-worries-on-googles-booksettlement.ars.
5. See Juan Carlos Perez, In Google Book Settlement, Business
Trumps Ideals, PC World, Oct. 30, 2008 http://www.pcworld.com/
businesscenter/article/153085/in_google_book_settlement_business_trumps_ideals.html; see also Fred von Lohmann, Google Is Done
Paying Silicon Valley’s Legal Bills, Recorder, Nov. 14, 2008, available
at http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/11/further-thoughts-googlebook-search-settlement.

stems from the fact that many scholars believed Google
would succeed on its fair use defense and “blaze a trail
on behalf of many, less wealthy Internet companies.”6
Instead, Google entered a settlement providing
itself with a strong advantage over its book scanning
competitors and a monopoly over millions of orphan
books.7
This article will look at this
argument and analyze whether
Google’s settlement was based on
self-interest or a strategic costbenefit analysis. Part II of this
article will explain the Google
Book Search Settlement. Part III
will analyze the effects a Google
win would have on copyright
law. Then, Part IV will compare
the Ninth and Second Circuits’
precedents to determine if Google
really could have set this “positive legal precedent.”
Finally, Part V will conclude that it is likely Google
would have failed in the Second Circuit leaving Google
with two options – to appeal to the Supreme Court or
single-handedly bring an end to online book scanning.
II. The Google Book Settlement
In 2004, Google entered into agreements to digitize
books with several libraries and universities, including
the New York Public Library, Harvard University,
Stanford University, Oxford University and the
University of Michigan. Seven million books were
scanned until issues arose concerning the digitization
of books protected by United States copyright law. In
2005, several authors and publishers brought a lawsuit
against Google, asserting copyright infringement.
Google denied such allegations, claiming that its display
of “snippets” or a few lines was protected under the
6. See Perez, supra note 4.
7. Miguel Helft, Opposition to Google Books Settlement Jells, N.Y.
Times.com, Apr. 17, 2009 available at http://bits.blogs.nytimes.
com/2009/04/17/opposition-to-google-books-settlement.
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doctrine of fair use. In 2007, however, rather than
going forward with its fair use defense, a settlement was
reached between the parties.
The proposed settlement establishes a $125 million
fund, providing authors who sign on to the agreement
a onetime nominal payment, plus future royalties. The
settlement also sets aside $34.5 million for a Book
Rights Registry, to locate rightsholders and create a
database of their contact information and the copyright
interests in their works. In exchange, Google will be
released from liability for its scanning, searching, and
displaying of books online.
Google will dedicate 63% of its net revenues from
the advertising that it shows on search results and
book display pages to authors. Thus, Google gets to
show 20% of the book online and sell digital copies
of it, keeping 37% of all revenues. Further, Google
has the right to scan books in print and use them for
research purposes. For books with no known authors,
orphan works as they are called, Google may scan these
works and hold a share of the revenues in trust for the
copyright owners, if they are ever exposed. These orphan
works, which according to UC Berkeley Professor
Pamela Samuelson constitute 70% of books that are
still in copyright,8 are at the center of the settlement’s
controversy.
III. What Could Have Been, the Consequences of a
“Positive Legal Precedent”
Mixed feelings surround the Google Book Settlement,
as Google’s competitors point to its unfairness and
researchers point to its potential. One journalist went as
far as to state, “by settling a lawsuit with book authors
and publishers this week, Google is looking out for itself
and has avoided fighting for and possibly establishing
a positive legal precedent for copyright fair use on
the Internet.”9 This section explores this assertion and
imagines a copyright world where fair use is a solid
defense for search engines.
A. Copyright in the Digital Age
Copyright scholars often find themselves unsatisfied
with the Supreme Court’s holding in MGM Studios,
8. Ryan Singel, The Fight over the Google of All Libraries: A Wired.
com FAQ, Wired.com, Apr. 30, 2009, http://www.wired.com/
epicenter/2009/04/the-fight-over-the-worlds-greatest-library-thewiredcom-faq/.
9. Perez, supra note 4.

34

Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,10 and are left longing for more
clarity in an increasingly digital world. In Sony Corp.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc,11 the Court held that
“the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other
articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes.”12 Originally the Ninth
Circuit applied Sony broadly in Grokster, finding that
producers could never be contributorily liable for third
parties’ infringing uses “even when an actual purpose to
cause infringing use is shown . . . unless the distributors
had specific knowledge of infringement at a time
when they contributed to the infringement and failed
to act upon that information.”13 The Supreme Court
unanimously rejected this holding, but instead applied
the inducement theory of secondary liability to reach
its conclusion.14 Thus, if the Supreme Court took the
Google Book Search case, not only would there be hope
for more clarity after Grokster, but new questions that
have arisen and new issues that have formed since 2005
could now be answered.
Beyond clarity, a positive legal precedent could provide
a road map for how innovative technologies such
as Google act on the Web. As Google continues to
develop, a variety of possibilities await it on the Web and
copyright law thus far has not been able to keep pace
with technology.15 A precedent holding that Google’s
fair use defense is viable may help both Google and its
competitors understand what they can do online and
what they can’t. Without such precedent, Internet
companies are rapidly experimenting and expanding
on the Web, but at their own risk. Not only would a
10. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
11. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
12. Id. at 442.
13. 545 U.S. at 933-34; see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
14. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934 (“we do not revisit Sony further,
as MGM requests, to add a more quantified description of the point
of balance between protection and commerce when liability rests
solely on distribution with knowledge that unlawful use will occur.
It is enough to note that the Ninth Circuit’s judgment rested on an
erroneous understanding of Sony and to leave further consideration
of the Sony rule for a day when that may be required.”).
15. See Steven Hetcher, The Half-Fairness of Google’s Plan to Make
the World’s Collection of Books Searchable, 13 Mich. Telecomm. &
Tech. L. Rev. 1, 9 (2006) (noting that “changes in technology are
creating market opportunities for Google on a global scale” and the
law hasn’t had a chance to respond. “Thus, Google finds itself in a
legal free zone and is seeking to do its best to exploit its opportunities. Rather than waiting for the law to adapt, Google is adopting a
proactive approach, seeking to create ‘private law’ that stands to be
maximally favorable to its interests.”).
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positive legal precedent induce innovation because it
would wipe out the fear of potential lawsuits, but it also
would serve judicial efficiency in preventing numerous
test cases from arising.
Further, a positive legal precedent could help copyright
law catch up with technology. “In the digital world,
controlling copying is less important than controlling
access to a work.”16 If this is the case, then a positive
legal precedent could go as far as rewriting copyright law,
focusing on preventing distribution to the public.17 Such
a decision could stem out of the fact that while Google is
copying entire works, the general public will only be able
to access a mere snippet of the work. The positive legal
precedent would allow copying or scanning of works,
provided that access to the public remained limited.
B. A Change in Ownership
i. Publishers
Why do we have the Google Book Search litigation to
begin with? Although publishers and authors contend
it is because their livelihood is being tested, scholars
argue that the answer is more basic: publishers want
their fair share of the profits Google will receive from the
Book Search project.18 With a positive legal precedent
in Google’s favor, content ownership shifts from the
possession of the publishers, to the possession of the
scanners. Further, without the settlement, all Internet
search engines, including Yahoo and Microsoft, would
become owners and distributors of content. While
many scholars understand the implications this has
for publishers, they note that the purpose of copyright
law is not to protect the publishers. Pursuant to the
Constitution, works are protected “to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.”19 Books will only
promote progress if they are read and will only be read if
they can be located. Thus,

16. Emily Anne Proskine, Note, Google’s Technicolor Dreamcoat:
A Copyright Analysis of the Google Book Search Library Project, 21
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 213, 238 (2006).
17. See id. (explaining that Copyright law should be rewritten to
focus on preventing distribution to the public, rather than to continue promoting a system “that impedes ‘normal use’ and technological advancement.”).
18. See id. at 239 (“What is certain is that a publishing house
bringing suit against Google is not in the battle to uphold its
constitutional right ‘to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts,’ but rather to obtain what it perceives to be its fair share of the
Google Library Project’s profits.”).
19. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

The Google Library Project advances the public interest
by making information globally accessible regardless
of a user’s income, geographic location, and proximity
to a library . . . The Project also simultaneously drives
publishers’ incentives to create by increasing their profits
based on increased exposure to book titles. Thus, the
Google Library Project is consistent with copyright law.20
Therefore, a positive legal precedent would not
only allow Google to continue the dissemination of
information and provide incentives for creation, but
other companies would be able to do this as well.
Essentially, the more digital libraries there are, the more
the goals of copyright will be promoted.
ii. Libraries
Not only could a positive legal precedent shift the role
of publishers, it also shifts the roles of public libraries:
public being the key word. Google is not the first
entity to want to collect the world’s knowledge. Once
upon a time, the Library of Alexandria was created
under this same notion, “to bring the sum total of
human knowledge together in one place at one time.”21
If Google is allowed to create a “digital Library of
Alexandria” it will be doing so as a private company.
Although many may take for granted that libraries
are publicly run, critics fear that a private company,
ultimately driven by profit maximization, could
drastically change the notion of libraries for everyone.22
Further, with legal precedent allowing the scanning,
numerous digital libraries could arise. However, instead
of these libraries being congenial partners on a mission
to locate books and distribute them to those who seek
them, these new private libraries will be competitors.
Private libraries will not reach out to other digital
libraries for support, instead they could be driven to oust
one another. Thus, although competition could bring
prices down and allow greater access to knowledge, it
also could drastically change the concept of the library.
While this could be a negative side to a positive legal
precedent, it is important to note that no matter how
drastically competition could change the landscape of
libraries, it usually always alters the landscape in a better
20. Proskine, supra note 15, at 239.
21. Hetcher, supra note 14, at 1.
22. See id. at 6 (“An important question raised by the Google Print
lawsuits, both domestically and internationally, is whether something as important as the digital Library of Alexandria should be in
the control of a private company . . . . driven by the motive of profit
maximization.”).

American University Intellectual Property Brief

35

way than a monopoly would. Without a positive legal
precedent there will likely only be one digital library.
The world does not exist under the regime of one public
library. Likely, it should not exist under the regime of
one digital library.
C. A Chance for Competitors
Also of importance, and mentioned throughout this
section, is that with a positive legal precedent Google’s
competitors will also be able to scan books and create
their own digital libraries. This, of course, would not
only include the larger companies, Yahoo and Microsoft,
but also numerous smaller companies who could
never fight the copyright battle in court due to smaller
budgets, but who indeed want a piece of the pie once
Google adds solidity to the flimsy fair use doctrine. 23
Alas, Google was the only entity willing to risk scanning
books and potential copyright infringement claims.
Further, Google would be the only company paying for
an extensive litigation on the fair use doctrine. Thus,
Google would have to go through extensive expenses
in order to get this positive legal precedent, only to
find that its competitors and many no name companies
could then do exactly what Google was doing before the
precedent. This fact alone could explain why Google
opted for the settlement over the litigation and how
a positive legal precedent could benefit everyone, but
Google.
D. The Unstoppable Google
Of course, the statement above is not entirely true.
While a positive legal precedent would certainly fuel
competition, competition shouldn’t and doesn’t scare
Google. Through Google’s constant creation of new
applications, it has found a way to continuously be
ahead of the curve and its competitors. Thus, a positive
legal precedent may create more book scanners, but by
the time the litigation would have ended, Google likely
would have set its sights on other potentials realized after
the Supreme Court held that Google’s fair use defense
was viable.
Google has already said it wants to collect all the
information in the world. With a positive legal
precedent confirming the fair use defense, what would
stop Google from next putting every movie in the world
on its databases, or every song? If the Court ruled in
23. See id. (“Should Google prevail, risks will be dramatically
decreased and one can expect competitors to rush in.”).
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favor of Google getting permission to scan books from
the libraries but not the copyright owners, why wouldn’t
the Court rule in favor of Google getting permission
from libraries but not copyright owners to scan DVDs
and CDs?24 Thus, if Google’s Book Search database is
approved, the amount of copyrighted work that Google
could exploit on its databases is infinite.
IV. But Could Google Win?
After a discussion of the positive legal precedent a
Google win could set on the copyright landscape, the
larger question unfolds: could Google even win? This
section analyzes relevant precedent in the Ninth and
Second Circuits. As the case would ultimately be
litigated in the Second Circuit, only cases from this
Circuit are binding. However, several opinions by the
Ninth Circuit have dealt with cases sharing similar facts
with the one at hand and this article will also explore
those holdings. Further, many who argue that Google
would succeed on its fair use defense have relied on cases
not from the Supreme Court or Second Circuit, but
from the Ninth Circuit, specifically, Kelly v. Arriba Soft
Corp.25
If Google proceeds in its litigation it will assert a fair
use defense. Under the affirmative defense of fair use,
Google is essentially admitting to copying, but claiming
that it is permitted under the doctrine. When analyzing
fair use, courts ultimately balance four factors. These are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use (including if it is
commercial in nature or a “transformative” use); (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount of the
work used; and (4) the effects or potential effects on the
market for the original work.26
A. Ninth Circuit Decisions
This section will analyze cases that many Google
advocates are arguing would support Google’s position.
However, it is important to keep in mind, that at most,
this is persuasive authority only, as the Second Circuit
is free to ignore the precedent established outside its
jurisdiction.
i. The Ninth Circuit and Fair Use
24. See id. at 6–7 (pointing out that libraries do in fact loan out
DVDs and CDs).
25. 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992); see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (“All four factors are to be explored, and
the results weighed together, in light of the purpose of copyright.”).
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In 2003, the Ninth Circuit decided Kelly v. Arriba
Soft Corp. The case was brought when Leslie Kelly, a
professional photographer, found thumbnail images
of his photographs on Arriba Soft’s search engine.
The court concluded that the “creation and use of the
thumbnails in the search engine is a fair use.”27 Going
through the analysis, the court first noted that “the more
transformative the new work, the less important the
other factors, including commercialism, become.”28 To
make this assertion, the court cited the Supreme Court’s
decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.29 In
Campbell, the Court analyzed the transformative nature
of the work under the first prong, noting that
The central purpose of this investigation is to see . . .
whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of
the original creation . . . or instead adds something new,
with a further purpose or different character, altering the
first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks,
in other words, whether and to what extent the new
work is “transformative.”30
Applying Campbell, the court found that “although
Arriba made exact replications of Kelly’s images, the
thumbnails were much smaller, lower-resolution images
that served an entirely different function than Kelly’s
original images.”31 Thus, while Kelly’s images were
“artistic works intended to inform and to engage the
viewer in an aesthetic experience,” Arriba’s search engine
used the images “to help index and improve access to
images on the Internet and their related web sites.”32 The
court also noted that users were unlikely to enlarge the
thumbnail images, as there constituted a much lowerresolution than the originals and an enlargement would
result in a significant loss of clarity. Further, while
evidence pointing towards transformative use was high,
the commercial use was low, as Arriba did not profit
from selling the image or use the images to directly
promote its website.33
Turning to the other prongs, the court found that
although photographs are generally considered creative
in nature, because Kelly published its images on the
27. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 815, 822 (2003).
28. Id. at 818.
29. 510 U.S. 569 (1994)
30. Id. at 579 (internal citations omitted).
31. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818.
32. Id.
33. See id. (“Because the use of Kelly’s images was not highly
exploitative, the commercial nature of the use weighs only slightly
against a finding of fair use.”).

Internet before Arriba used them in its search engine,
the second prong only weighed slightly in favor of Kelly.
The third prong was found to favor neither party, as
it was reasonable to copy the entire image in light of
Arriba’s use.34 Finally, the court found that not only did
Arriba’s use of Kelly’s images not harm the market of
Kelly’s images; it actually helped it. By displaying the
thumbnails of Kelly’s images, the search engine would
guide users to Kelly’s website, rather than detract from
it.35
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit decided Field v. Google.36
The case centered on Google’s main search engine,
which scans the web using a “web crawler” known as the
“Googlebot.”37 The web crawler scans the Internet to
locate, analyze, and catalog the webpages into Google’s
searchable index, making a temporary repository of each
webpage it finds called a “cache.”38 When clicked, the
cached link directs an Internet user to the archival copy
of a webpage, rather than to the original website for that
page.39 Field contended that allowing Internet users to
access archival copies of 51 of his copyrighted works
stored by Google in an online repository violated Field’s
exclusive rights to reproduce copies and distribute copies
of those works.40
Looking at the purpose and character of the use, the
court used Kelly to find that Google’s cached links
were transformative.41 Further, the court noted that
although Google is a for-profit corporation, no evidence
demonstrated that Google profited from Field’s
work.42 The court concluded, “the fact that Google is a
34. See id. at 821 (noting that “it was necessary for Arriba to copy
the entire image to allow users to recognize the image and decide
whether to pursue more information about the image or the originating web site. If Arriba only copied part of the image, it would be
more difficult to identify it, thereby reducing the usefulness of the
visual search engine.”).
35. Id.
36. 412 F.Supp.2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006).
37. Id. at 1110; see also Cameron W. Westin, Is Kelly Shifting Under
Google’s Feet? New Ninth Circuit Impact on the Google Library Project
Litigation, 2007 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 2, 26 (2007) (discussing how
Google’s search engine uses its web crawler to scan pages online and
catalogue these pages into Google’s searchable database.).
38. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1110–11.
39. Id. at 1111.
40. Id. at 1109.
41. See id. at 1118–19 (“Because Google serves different and
socially important purposes in offering access to copyrighted works
through ‘Cached’ links and does not merely supersede the objectives
of the original creations, the Court concludes that Google’s alleged
copying and distribution of Field’s Web pages containing copyrighted works was transformative.”).
42. See id. at 1120 (noting that Field’s work was among billions of
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commercial operation is of only minor relevance in the
fair use analysis. The transformative purpose of Google’s
use is considerably more important, and, as in Kelly,
means the first factor of the analysis weighs heavily in
favor of a fair use finding.”43 Although balancing the
other three factors led the court to rule in the favor of
fair use, the court added an additional prong to its fair
use analysis: Google’s good faith. The court noted that
Google honors industry-standard protocols that site
owners use to instruct search engines not to provide
cached links for the pages of their sites. Field both
failed to inform Google to not cache his site and took
a variety of steps to get his work included in Google’s
search results. “Comparing Field’s conduct with Google’s
provides further weight to the scales in favor of a finding
of fair use.”44
Finally, in 2007, the Ninth Circuit decided Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,45 a case focusing on Google’s
“Google Images” feature. Perfect 10 markets and sells
copyrighted images of nude models. The issue arose
in this case when Google’s search engine automatically
indexed the webpages of websites that republished
Perfect 10’s images without authorization. Thus, Google
users could click on the thumbnail image provided by
Google’s search engine and access third-party webpages
with full-sized infringing images.46
Under the fair use analysis the court used Kelly to
hold that “Google’s use of thumbnails is highly
transformative.”47 Thus, per Kelly, “even making an
exact copy of a work may be transformative so long as
the copy serves a different function than the original
work.”48 The court further rejected the district court’s
finding that since Google’s thumbnails “lead users to
works in the Google database and no advertisements were placed on
the cached pages).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1122–23.
45. 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007).
46. Legal action was sought against Amazon.com because of the
agreement between Google and Amazon.com, in which Amazon.
com is allowed to in-line link to Google’s search results. As the
court explains, “Amazon.com gave its users the impression that
Amazon.com was providing search results, but Google communicated the search results directly to Amazon.com’s users. Amazon.com
routed users’ search queries to Google and automatically transmitted
Google’s responses (i.e., HTML instructions for linking to Google’s
search results) back to its users.” Id. at 712.
47. See id. at 721 (noting that “a search engine puts images ‘in
a different context’ so that they are ‘transformed into a new creation.’”).
48. Id. at 721–22 (citing Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp, 336 F.3d at
818–19).
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sites that directly benefit Google’s bottom line,” the
AdSense program increased the commercial nature
of Google’s use of Perfect 10′s images.49 Instead, the
court concluded that the “significantly transformative
nature of Google’s search engine, particularly in light
of its public benefit, outweighs Google’s superseding
and commercial uses of the thumbnails in this case.”50
Balancing the other factors led the court to hold in favor
of fair use.
ii. The Google Book Search and Fair Use
Kelly has already allowed Google to prevail in Field
and Perfect 10, and many advocates argue it could have
likely given the Google Book Search the capacity to
prevail on its fair use defense. If these cases were used
as controlling, on the first factor it is very likely that the
court would have found Google’s use transformative in
nature. Google is not simply reproducing the books
and allowing the public to access them in their entirety.
Instead, Google displays “snippets” of the books used
for locating materials relevant to search queries and
“keyword” searches. It, therefore, serves a purpose
and function very different than that of the original
book. Further, the ability to search for keyword results
has enormous potentials for researchers, making the
project a clear public benefit.51 Therefore, it is likely
that the court would find, as it did in Perfect 10, that
the “significantly transformative nature of Google’s
search engine, particularly in light of its public benefit,
outweighs Google’s superseding and commercial uses of
the books in this case.”52
Moving to the nature and character of the use, while
many of the books Google copies are creative, they
have all been published and therefore do not encroach
on the author’s right of first publication.53 Further,
49. Id. at 722–23; see Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d
828, 847 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
50. Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 723; see also id. (“Accordingly, we disagree with the district court’s conclusion that because Google’s use
of the thumbnails could supersede Perfect 10′s cell phone download use and because the use was more commercial than Arriba’s,
this fair use factor weighed ‘slightly’ in favor of Perfect 10. Instead,
we conclude that the transformative nature of Google’s use is more
significant than any incidental superseding use or the minor commercial aspects of Google’s search engine and website. Therefore, the
district court erred in determining this factor weighed in favor of
Perfect 10.”).
51. See Westin, supra note 36, at 48.
52. Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 723.
53. Westin, supra note 36, at 49; see Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp, 336
F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The fact that a work is published or
unpublished also is a critical element of its nature. Published works
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while as in Kelly, Google copies the works in full, such
wholesale copying is necessary to create a functional
search engine.54 Finally, while it is arguable whether the
content-owners of library books may lose the licensing
value of their works due to Google’s actions, the searchengine is not created to replace the demand for full
books and is instead designed to lead users to locations
for purchasing the original works. As in Kelly, it can
be argued that this not only does not detract from the
market, it instead enhances it.55 Finally, the court could
choose to look at the additional good faith prong added
by the court in Field. Such good faith efforts in the
Google Book Search include the opt-out provision that
Google has designed. Thus, while providing an “optout” method alone would not immunize a defendant
from copyright infringement claims, “volunteering
a relatively simple and effective method for content
owners to prevent their works from being included in a
vast project may lessen the image of authors’ works being
wrestled from their grasp.”56
B. Second Circuit Decisions
While Google defenders rest on Kelly and subsequent
case law, it is important to remember that it is the
Second Circuit, and not the Ninth Circuit, that would
decide this case. Thus, there is a different body of case
law that the Second Circuit would look to in order to
reach its decision. Further, the East Coast’s Second
Circuit has proven much less pragmatic than the West
Coast’s Ninth Circuit.57 This section will analyze relevant
precedent set in the Second Circuit and analyze how
such precedent would have guided the court in the
current Google litigation.
are more likely to qualify as fair use because the first appearance of
the artist’s expression has already occurred. Kelly’s images appeared
on the Internet before Arriba used them in its search image.”); see
also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 723 (9th
Cir. 2007) (“Once Perfect 10 has exploited this commercially valuable right of first publication by putting its images on the Internet
for paid subscribers, Perfect 10 is no longer entitled to the enhanced
protection available for an unpublished work.”); Field v Google,
412 F.Supp.2d 1106, 1120 (D. Nev. 2006) (holding that the nature
of the copyrighted works weighed only slightly in favor of Field
because “even assuming Field’s copyrighted works are as creative as
the works at issue in Kelly, like Kelly, Field published his works on
the Internet, thereby making them available to the world for free at
his Web site.”).
54. See Westin, supra note 36, at 49
55. See id.
56. Id. at 54.
57. Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Googilization of Everything and the
Future of Copyright, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1207, 1225 (2007).

In the Google Book Search Settlement, the East Cost
and West Coast house two different interests. In this
case, the East Coast is home to authors and publishers.58
Here, “content is king,” and therefore its protection is
a powerful interest.59 Across the country, however, the
West Coast is home to Google and content distributors,
rather than content creators.60 Thus, Google’s litigation
in the Second Circuit gives its adversaries – authors and
publishers – home court advantage.61 With this natural
bias in mind, it is then important to turn to case law and
binding precedent.
i. The Second Circuit and Fair Use
In the same year that the Supreme Court was debating
contributory liability in Sony, the Second Circuit
reached its decision in Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody’s Investors
Servs., Inc.62 In this case, Financial Information Inc.
(“FII”), a publisher of financial information, contended
that Moody’s stole its copyrighted material from its
Bond Service. At trial, FII demonstrated that there
was a 95% certainty that Moody’s had copied at least
40–50% of FFI’s information in the years 1980 and
1981.63 Laying out the fair use factors, the court found
that Moody’s did not make out a proper defense. The
court began its analysis by finding “there is no argument
and of course can be no doubt but that Moody’s use is
commercial, and thus presumptively unfair.”64 Further,
the court rejected the “public function” of Moody’s use.65
Thus, based on the presumption of unfair use, the court
found in favor of FII on the first factor.
Placing little emphasis on the second factor, which
the court found to favor fair use, the court placed
significant emphasis on the third factor. The court
found significant evidence offered at trial by Professor
Herbert Robbins, Professor of Mathematical Statistics
at Columbia University, that it was statistically certain
(95–99% probable) that Moody’s had copied at the
40–50% level.66 The court considered this “substantial,
if not wholesale copying by Moody’s from FII.”67 Finally,
with respect to the fourth factor, the court found that
58. Westin, supra note 36, at 12.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 13.
62. 751 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1984).
63. Id. at 503.
64. Id. at 508.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 509.
67. Id.
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FII might be in a position to license the infringed use for
a fee and noted that harm to the copyright owner “may
be presumed.”68
In 2000, the Southern District of New York found itself
faced with a copyright infringement claim concerning
downloading music on the Internet. In UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.69 the court began by
asserting that, “The complex marvels of cyberspatial
communication may create difficult legal issues; but
not in this case. Defendant’s infringement of plaintiffs’
copyrights is clear.”70 Employing the fair use factors,
the court found the purpose and the character of the
use to be commercial.71 Further the court found that
retransmitting the copies into another medium was
insufficient to constitute as transformative.72 Thus, as
MP3.com failed to add “new aesthetics, new insights
and understandings” to the original music recordings it
copied, but instead “simply repackages those recordings
to facilitate their transmission through another
medium,” its works could be considered innovative, but
not transformative.73 Balancing the other three facts, the
court found MP3.com’s fair use defense indefensible as a
matter of law and ruled in favor of the copyright owners.
More recently, the Second Circuit has ruled in favor
of fair use. In 2005, Blanch v. Koons74 decided an
infringement claim of a copyrighted photograph. In
this case, Andrea Blanch, copyright owner of her
photograph “Silk Sandals by Gucci,” alleged that Jeff
Koons copied the model’s legs, feet, and Gucci sandals
from the photograph in his painting entitled, “Niagara.”
Undertaking a fair use analysis the court first found
Koons’ use of the work to be transformative, finding
“no original creative or imaginative aspect of Blanch’s
photograph . . . included in Koons’ painting.”75 Under
68. Id. at 510 (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417 (1984)).
69. 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
70. Id. at 350.
71. See id. at 351 (“for while subscribers to My.MP3.com are not
currently charged a fee, defendant seeks to attract a sufficiently large
subscription base to draw advertising and otherwise make a profit.”).
72. See id. (“Here, although defendant recites that My.MP3.com
provides a transformative ‘space shift’ by which subscribers can
enjoy the sound recordings contained on their CDs without lugging
around the physical discs themselves, this is simply another way
of saying that the unauthorized copies are being retransmitted in
another medium–an insufficient basis for any legitimate claim of
transformation.”).
73. Id.
74. 396 F.Supp.2d 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
75. Id. at 481.
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the nature of the copyrighted work, the court found
that the photograph was sufficiently creative and its
publication in a magazine throughout the United States
favored fair use. On the third factor, the court found
that because the quality of the copyright protection for
crossed legs is weak, the third factor was neutral between
the parties. Finally, on the fourth factor the court found
in favor of defendants as “Niagara” was not a substitute
for Blanche’s photograph and was in no way competitive
with it.
In 2006, the Second Circuit found in Bill Graham
Archives. v. Dorling Kindersely Ltd.76 a viable fair use
defense. In 2003, Dorling Kindersley Ltd (“DK”)
published a 480-page coffee table book entitled
“Grateful Dead: the Illustrated Trip.” Issue arose
when Bill Graham Archives (“BGA”) claimed to own
the copyright to seven images displayed in the book.
Employing the fair use test, the court found that by
placing the photographs in chronological order, DK’s use
was “transformatively different from the mere expressive
use of images on concert posters or tickets.”77 Regarding
the second fair use factor, the court found against DK
because BGA’s images were creative artworks. However,
the court noted that where the work is found to be
transformative under the first factor, the second factor
becomes of limited use.78
Next, the court found that even though the images
were reproduced in their entirety, “the third fair use
factor weighed in favor of DK because the images were
displayed in reduced size and scattered among many
other images and texts.”79 In reaching this decision, the
court noted that sister circuits “have concluded that
such copying does not necessarily weigh against fair use
because copying the entirety of a work is sometimes
necessary to make a fair use of the image.”80 Similar to
Kelly, the court noted that while the copyrighted images
were copied in its entirety, the visual impact of its artistic
expression was significantly limited due to its reduced
size. This led the court to conclude, “that such use by
DK is tailored to further its transformative purpose
76. 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).
77. Id. at 609.
78. Id. at 613; see also id. at 612–13 (“Accordingly, we hold that
even though BGA’s images are creative works, which are a core concern of copyright protection, the second factor has limited weight in
our analysis because the purpose of DK’s use was to emphasize the
images’ historical rather than creative value.”).
79. Id. at 613.
80. Id. (citing Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821 (9th
Cir. 2003)).
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because DK’s reduced size reproductions of BGA’s
images in their entirety displayed the minimal image size
and quality necessary to ensure the reader’s recognition
of the images as historical artifacts of Grateful Dead
concert events.”81 Finally, looking to the fourth factor,
the court first recognized that it did not find harm to
BGA’s license market simply because DK did not pay a
fee for the copyrighted images.82 Then, because DK’s use
of BGA’s images was transformative, the court concluded
that BGA did not suffer market harm due to the loss of
license fees.83
ii. Google Book Search and Fair Use
Looking at the Second Circuit’s binding case law as
a whole demonstrates that Google would likely not
fair well against copyright owners and publishers of
books. While newer Second Circuit decisions have
allowed the fair use doctrine to prevail, its application
of the transformative standard differs significantly
from that held in the Ninth Circuit.84 Both the Ninth
and Second Circuits have used Campbell to support
its transformative analysis. However, Bill Graham
Archives and Blanch appear to have adopted a different
transformative standard than did Kelly, Field and Perfect
10. The differences between the standards is based
on different weights to different values, “whereas the
Campbell opinion recognized the value of new creative
expression containing commentary that depends of
previously created expression, the Ninth Circuit saw
value in improving ‘access to information on the
Internet.’’85 Thus, although Bill Graham Archives goes
as far as citing to Kelly, both Bill Graham Archives and
Blanch involved the unauthorized uses of copyrighted
material to create new authorship.86 Further, “both
opinions indicate that uses, such as Google’s, that do
not involve the creation of new expression containing
commentary are not transformative.”87
81. Id.
82. Id. at 614.
83. Id. at 614-15.
84. Matt Williams, Recent Second Circuit Opinions Indicate that
Google’s Library Project Is Not Transformative, 25 Cardozo Arts &
Ent. L.J. 303, 319 (2007).
85. Id. at 305–06.
86. See id. at 319 (noting that even though Bill Graham Archives
cited Kelly, both Bill Graham Archives and Blanch “involved unauthorized uses of copyrighted material to create new authorship
containing commentary, and both opinions indicate that uses that
do not involve the creation of new expression containing commentary are not transformative.”).
87. Id.

Thus, applying the fair use doctrine in the Second
Circuit comes down to how the Second Circuit
will rule on the transformative nature of Google’s
use. Since Google’s use is commercial, it will have to
make a strong showing of transformation in order to
overcome this prong.88 In Blanch, the Second Circuit
did not hold Koons’ work to be transformative solely
because it found a new purpose or function for Blanch’s
photograph. Instead, the court cautiously explained
that Koons’ repurposing of Blanch’s work involved the
creation of new expression containing commentary.89
Further, in Bill Graham Archives, the defendant was
able to prevail because it presented its readers with
information that augmented the value and effectiveness
of the commentary in its new work.90 Thus, Bill Graham
Archives, cites Kelly for the narrow principle that it
is important to use copyrighted material for a new
purpose that provides the public with information.91
The court did not cite Kelly for the broad principle that
a use can be transformative for altering the function
in order to increase access to information.92 In fact, in
MP3.Com the court found that retransmitting copies
into another medium was insufficient to constitute as
transformative.93 In the Google Book Search, Google
did not create new authorship with commentary.
Despite the new webpages, databases, and search engine
programs provided by Google, none of these features
provide the public with new information. Thus, because
Google adds no new commentary, it likely will not be
found to be transformative. The lack of transformation
coupled with the commercial nature of Google’s use
would likely lead Google to fail under the first prong.
Succeeding on the first prong is not always critical.94
88. See Fin. Info. Inc. v. Moody’s Investors Servs., Inc., 751 F.2d
501, 508 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that commercial use is “presumptively unfair”).
89. Williams, supra note 83, at 319.
90. Id. at 323.
91. Id. at 321.
92. Id. at 323–24.
93. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F.Supp.2d
349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Here, although defendant recites that
My.MP3.com provides a transformative ‘space shift’ by which
subscribers can enjoy the sound recordings contained on their
CDs without lugging around the physical discs themselves, this is
simply another way of saying that the unauthorized copies are being
retransmitted in another medium-an insufficient basis for any legitimate claim of transformation”).
94. But see Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150
F.3d 132 (2d Cir 1998) (determining that the a trivia game of the
television show Seinfeld was not transformative because its purpose
was not to educate, criticize or expose viewers to the “nothingness”
of the show, but to “repackage Seinfeld to entertain Seinfeld viewers.”
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The test balances each factor, and therefore if Google
can come up strong on the other factors it can still
succeed on fair use.95 Unfortunately, not even Google
advocates argue that Google will succeed on the second
prong that looks at the nature of the work. Books are
highly creative works and rest at the heart of copyright
protection. Further, while the copying of an entire
work has not bothered the Second Circuit, it has
allowed such wholesale copying only when the work
is transformative.96 Because Google’s use is probably
not transformative by nature, the Second Circuit will
likely compare such copying to Moody’s rather than Bill
Graham Archives. Finally, on the fourth factor, unlike
in Blanch where the court found that the defendant’s
photograph was not a substitute for the plaintiff’s
photograph and was in no way competitive with it, it
can be argued that Google is directly competing with
books. Further, Bill Graham Archives will be of little
use to Google, as the court concluded that BGA did not
suffer market harm due to the loss of licensing fees only
because DK’s use of BGA’s images were transformative.
Here, as mentioned above, Google’s use of the books
is likely not transformative.97 Therefore, although
Google advocates argue it can make a strong showing
that Google will not harm the copyright owners and
publishers’ market, based on Second Circuit case law,
such a win is unlikely.
V. Conclusion
Failure at the Second Circuit might not be the end
of the road for Google. With a split between the
Ninth and Second Circuit on how to qualify a work as
transformative, the Supreme Court may agree to take the
Ultimately, the determination that the work was not transformative had a significant role in determining the other three factors.
When looking at the second factor the court held that, “the fictional
nature of the copyrighted work remains significant in the instant
case, where the secondary use is at best minimally transformative.”
On the third prong the court specifically noted, “The SAT does not
serve a critical or otherwise transformative purpose.” Finally, on the
fourth factor the court stated “the more transformative the secondary use, the less likelihood that the secondary use substitutes for the
original.”).
95. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)
(“All four factors are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purpose of copyright.”).
96. See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448
F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding that where the work is
found to be transformative under the first factor, the second factor
becomes of limited use. “Even though the copyrighted images are
copied in their entirety . . . such use by DK is tailored to further its
transformative purpose . . . .”).
97. Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 614–15.
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case. However, following the holding in Campbell it is
likely that the Court will side with the Second Circuit.98
Further, it is interesting to note that the Second Circuit
is a very well respected Circuit when it comes to
copyright issues, and the Supreme Court may be more
willing to take its interpretation of the transformative
prong seriously. Already the Supreme Court has taken
copyright cases from both the Ninth Circuit (Grokster)
and the Second Circuit (Tasini v. New York Times Co.,
Inc.99). The difference, however, is that the Supreme
Court upheld the Second Circuit’s ruling and sided with
the writers while it unanimously overruled the Ninth
Circuit that favored the infringers.100
Ultimately the question of whether the Supreme Court
would take the Google Book Search case and whether
it would rule in Google’s favor is a question for another
article. This article’s focus was to ponder the possibility
of a positive legal precedent, and then conclude that
despite the sweeping changes that would come with new
precedent, the likelihood of actually getting the Second
Circuit to rule in Google’s favor is slim. Thus, if the
Second Circuit ruled against Google and the Supreme
Court took the case and agreed with the Second Circuit,
the Ninth Circuit would have to change its pattern
of ruling in favor of fair use, at least to the extent of
deeming a work transformative merely because it has
been placed online. What would be the effects of a
negative legal precedent?
Before Google entered settlement negotiations in 2007,
a scholar described Google as “an intellectual property
owner’s worst enemy: a risk-taking iconoclast with deep
pockets, seemingly unafraid to litigate licensing issues all
the way to the Supreme Court.”101 Perhaps the scholar
got it wrong; perhaps Google was afraid to litigate fair
use “all the way to the Supreme Court.” Or maybe
Google realized that this was a battle it could only win
98. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583 (finding a parody transformative because the song at issue “reasonably could be perceived as
commenting on the original or criticizing it to some degree.”); see
also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S.
539, 543 (1985) (noting that defendant “attempted no independent
commentary, research or criticism”).
99. 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
100. See also Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc, 464 U.S.
417 (1984) (reversing the Ninth Circuit’s holding that petitioners
were liable for contributory infringement); Accord Harper & Row,
471 U.S. at 542 (reversing the Second Circuit’s decision that The
Nation’s act constituted a fair use.)
101. James Gibson, Accidental Rights, 116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part
348, 349 (2007).
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by settling rather then fighting.102

102. See Hetcher, supra note 14 at 9. (“Google may believe that,
by engaging in an all-out legal battle, the publishing industry will be
forced into submission through a settlement on terms favorable to
the Google Print project.”).
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